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Insurance.  An ingenious modern game of chance in which the 
player is permitted to enjoy the comfortable conviction that he is beating 
the man who keeps the table.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Read now, Ambrose Bierce’s infamous definition of insurance falls 
short of the mark; players in today’s insurance game do not even have 
“the comfortable conviction” that an insurer will welcome its contractual 
duties to defend2 and indemnify.3  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. History, Rice 
University, cum laude, 1999. 
 1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press 1999) 
(1911). 
 2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the “duty to defend” 
clause in a liability insurance contract as that which obligates the insurer to “take over the 
defense of any lawsuit brought by a third party against the insured on a claim that falls 
1
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recently revisited the question of insurance coverage in Thommes v. 
Milwaukee Insurance Co.,4 which involved a commercial general 
liability (CGL) policy.5  As formally defined, CGL insurance is a class of 
insurance “that covers damages that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay to a third party because of bodily injury or property 
damage.”6  Yet given the broad opening provision of a standard CGL 
contract, CGL insurance’s relatively narrow scope is not immediately 
apparent; a CGL insurer “will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or 
‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.”7  A CGL policy 
 
within the policy’s coverage”).  The duty to defend forms a crucial component of 
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) coverage because “[w]hether a contractor 
lacking the resources necessary for protracted litigation can shift the cost of defending a 
counterclaim to the insurer may color or even determine the outcome” of a litigation.  F. 
Malcolm Cunningham, Jr. & Amy L. Fischer, Insurance Coverage in Construction—The 
Unanswered Question, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1063, 1081 (1998). 
 3. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 772 (defining “indemnify” as to “reimburse (another) 
for a loss suffered because of a third party’s act or default”).  The duties to defend and 
indemnify are considered to be the two primary duties that an insurer owes its insured. 4 
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION 
LAW § 11:19 (2002 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter BRUNER & O’CONNOR]. The duty to 
defend is broader than the duty to indemnify in the sense that, even if an action that leads 
to a judgment against an insured turns out not to be covered, an insurer still may have 
been “obligated to defend its insured if one or more of the allegations in the complaint 
fall within coverage.” Id. 
 4. 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002). 
 5. See generally 7 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:11 (3d ed. 
1999 & Supp. 2003).  As one commentator recounts, CGL used to stand for 
“comprehensive,” but changed to “commercial” in 1986; this is considered to be 
emblematic of the narrowing of coverage over the years.  Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise 
and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001). 
 6. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 809.  CGL is one of multiple forms of insurance on a 
construction project. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, § 11:1. As opposed to 
CGL coverage for third party property, the owner of what is being worked on “often 
carries [first] party property coverage, generally in the form of a builder’s risk policy.” 
Id.  The coverages carried by contractors and subcontractors are required by either state 
law, such as workers compensation coverage, or the parties’ contracts, such as CGL 
coverage, along with automobile liability and contractual liability insurance. See id.  
“Most contractors also carry excess or umbrella policies providing insurance for covered 
losses that exceed the limits of their primary coverage.”  Id. 
 7. Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) Commercial General Liability Form No. 
CG 00 02 07 98 [hereinafter CGL Policy]. The standard form policy provides that 
liability insurance does not cover: 
That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors 
working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing 
operations if the [third party’s property damage claim] arises out of 
those operations or 
2
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must realize the narrower purpose thrashed out for it through specialized 
definitions8 and exclusions.9  It is upon these exclusions that the 
Thommes decision turned. In the process of contending with the 
particular exclusions raised, the Thommes court forestalled one internal 
contradiction about the timing of damages but disregarded a second on 
how a CGL contract should be adjudicated. 
Coverage under a CGL contract is determined as a matter of law.10  
 
That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or 
replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it . . . .  
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it 
and included in the [complete operations hazard coverage] . . . .  
[Property damage claims] arising out of: 
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in “your 
product” or “your work” or 
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to 
perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms. 
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property 
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to “your product” 
or “your work” after it has been put to its intended use. 
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense insured by you or 
others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, 
replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of 
(1) “your product” 
(2) “your work” or 
(3) “impaired property” 
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the 
market or from use by any person or organization because of a known 
or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in 
it. 
Keith A. Dotseth et al., Evolution or Revolution: Thommes’ Role in the Development of 
the Business Risk Doctrine, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 597, 599-600 (2002) (citing 
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § T4.2 (1994) (quoting 
INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG-00-01-11-88 
(1988), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF 
INSURANCE 186-87 (1990) (paragraph labels omitted)). 
 8. An insurance policy commonly defines operative terms to achieve narrower 
coverage. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:11. “[I]t is possible that the same 
term may have different meanings depending upon the section of the policy in which it is 
found.  If a term is not defined, then to the extent that it is clear and unambiguous, it is 
given its plain, ordinary and popular sense.”  Id. 
 9. Though a standard insurance policy has standard exclusions, it may be tailored 
to increase or restrict coverage depending on the needs of a specific insured through the 
use of endorsements.  4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, § 11:13. 
 10. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. 
3
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To interpret policies and their exclusions, courts examine not only the 
four corners of the document but also often reach beyond the document 
to what is known as the “business risk doctrine.”11  The general concept 
behind the business risk doctrine is that an insured “should not look to its 
CGL insurer to cover business risks that are within its own control.”12  
As one commentator has elaborated: 
The risk of replacing and repairing defective materials or poor 
workmanship has generally been considered a commercial risk 
which is not passed on to the liability insurer.  Rather liability 
coverage [through a CGL policy] comes into play when the 
insured’s defective materials or work cause injury to property 
other than the insured’s own work.13 
In effect, a court that follows the business risk doctrine is to make a 
distinction between tort and contract claims; CGL policies provide 
coverage to an insured for tort claims from third parties, but not for 
contract liability arising from damages on the insured’s customer’s 
property.14 
Whether the business risk doctrine merely aids the courts as an 
interpretative device or risks supplanting a contract’s actual language is a 
matter of controversy.15  Regardless of which side one takes, however, 
 
 11. It has been remarked that if you “[t]urn the CGL policy upside down and shake 
it vigorously . . . [w]hat won’t shake out is the ‘business risk doctrine.’ ”  James Duffy 
O’Connor, What Every Construction Lawyer Should Know About CGL Coverage for 
Defective Construction, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW 15, 15 (2001). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Robert J. Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims Under 
Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 787 (1995). 
 14. Dotseth et al., supra note 7, at 601.  One commentator has argued that the 
distinction between tort (covered) and contract (not covered) claims has little or no 
logical basis in fact because both arise from negligent or somehow defective work. See 
Clifford J. Shapiro, Further Reflections—Inadvertent Construction Defects Are an 
“Occurrence” under Commercial General Liability Policies, 686 PLI/LIT 73, 98 (2003);  
see also O’Connor, supra note 11, at 18. “So what that the insured was negligent?  Isn’t 
that exactly why consumers buy insurance? . . . It is precisely to cover the risk that each 
of these insureds will fail to act in a reasonably prudent manner on occasion that each 
buys general liability insurance.”  Id.  Nevertheless, it is possible for a “contractual 
liability coverage” provision to be added to a CGL policy.  See 7 RUSS, supra note 5, at § 
103:19. 
 15. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37. “The problem with 
employing a ‘business risk’ concept in a coverage analysis is the danger that 
preconceived notions as to what risks insurance is intended to cover can distract one from 
objectively interpreting policy language.” Id. “The ‘business risk’ concept plays a more 
subtle interpretative role in jurisdictions that have not elevated it to a doctrine.  In many 
cases, the concept is used to ‘explain’ the meaning of exclusionary language.  This is 
often done in the guise of engaging in an objective interpretation of policy language.  
4
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the reality is that since the business risk doctrine came to be recognized 
just over thirty years ago, a court’s incorporation of it into a decision has 
usually meant that an insured does not get coverage—until now.16   
In a striking reversal of fortune, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Thommes held that the intent of the business risk doctrine rendered a 
CGL policy’s language ambiguous and, as a result, the contract had to be 
construed in favor of the insured to provide coverage.17  Yet given how 
earlier Minnesota cases presented the business risk doctrine, it is unclear 
on the face of the case how the court reached its decision.  As originally 
formulated, the business risk doctrine dictated that a CGL policy should 
cover only tort liability for completed work that causes damages.18  
Thommes did indeed involve tort, but for damages that arose during the 
course of the insured’s work.19  By nevertheless allowing coverage, 
Thommes set forth a rule that the risk intended to be insured is for tort 
liability, no matter at what point it arises.20  Without broadcasting it, 
Thommes’ disregard for timing broke away from the rote formulation of 
the business risk doctrine. 
Thommes’ revision of the business risk doctrine must be inferred. It 
 
Yet, the ‘business risk’ rule is an insurance industry trade concept.  By employing the 
‘business risk’ rule to interpret exclusionary language, courts in reality are applying a 
‘custom and usage’ process to determine the extent of coverage.  Unfortunately, most 
insureds are not steeped in industry practice.” Id. 
 16. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37;  see also O’Connor, 
supra note 11, at 15 (characterizing the business risk doctrine as a “tried and true 
weapon” of the insurance industry and “the main obstacle” to property damage 
coverage). 
 17. See Thommes, 641 N.W.2d 877, 883 (Minn. 2002).  See also 27 DUNNELL 
MINN. DIGEST Insurance § 19.01(b) (4th ed. 1995) (stating Minnesota law as it currently 
stands on the issue of CGL coverage for third-party tort liability claims: “A contractor’s 
general liability policy provides coverage for insurance risks, but not business risks.  
Where the insured’s defective work causes property damage or personal injury to a third 
party, however, the third-party claim is covered by the policy and is not barred by the 
business risk doctrine.” (citing Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Tremco Inc., 513 N.W.2d 473 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 18. Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and 
Completed Operations—What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 
(1971). 
 19. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. 
 20. The Thommes court essentially based its decision granting coverage as an 
attempt to follow the dictates of “the underlying purpose of CGL insurance.”  Id. at 883.  
The underlying purpose, as the court saw it, was to cover the risk that an insured’s work 
will cause property damage to a third party’s property that “may give rise to tort 
liability.”  Id. at 881 (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 323 N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (Minn. 1982)).  The court did not qualify this statement with 
any timing considerations. Id. 
5
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is therefore unclear whether the court changed the formulation of the 
business risk doctrine intentionally or unconsciously.  Although the court 
in Thommes closely split over the holding, neither the majority opinion 
nor the dissent mentioned the issue of timing.21  It appears that this 
disregard of timing reflects what the court—both majority and dissent—
understood the business risk doctrine to mean all along, rendering a 
change within Thommes unconscious.  Thus, even should either side 
reflect that Thommes did effect a change, neither would be prompted to 
reverse itself. Thommes’ significance lies in the fact that the court finally 
managed to state what it thought. 
Tracking the Minnesota courts’ wording of the business risk 
doctrine, however, also reveals an intrinsic conundrum.  On the one 
hand, coverage under a CGL contract is supposed to be decided as a 
matter of law.22  Yet on the other hand, whether a tort such as negligence 
is committed is primarily a question of fact.23  According to the business 
risk doctrine, insureds cannot receive coverage for damages from risks 
they could have avoided.24  Whether a risk is avoidable usually comes 
down to whether or not the insured was negligent, inherently involving a 
question of fact.25  The business risk doctrine can never be fully realized 
as long as the doctrine thrusts courts into the position of having to decide 
questions of fact as a matter of law. 
This note first examines the theory behind the business risk doctrine 
in analyzing CGL insurance.26  It then details the supreme court’s 
holding in Thommes,27 followed by an analysis of that decision.28  
Finally, the note concludes that, whatever problems may exist, the court 
 
 21. Justice Page wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stringer wrote the dissent, 
joined by Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Paul H. Anderson.  Id. at 884-85.  Because the 
majority saw the underlying purpose of CGL insurance as a blanket means to cover 
potential tort liability to third parties, the majority’s opinion did not contain any timing 
qualifications.  Id. at 881-83.  The dissent did not dispute the majority’s characterization 
of the purpose of CGL insurance; rather, the dissent faulted the majority for relying on a 
conception of CGL insurance in place of the contract’s actual language.  Id. at 884-85. 
 22. Id. at 879 (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 
2001) and Haarstad v. Graff, 517 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn. 1994)). 
 23. Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 823 (N.D. 1968). 
 24. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15. 
 25. In Minnesota, a CGL policy may be interpreted to cover negligence, but not 
intentional torts.  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn. 
1977). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
6
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has devised a manageable approach to CGL insurance coverage.29 
II. HISTORY 
A CGL contract is the most common of the insurance industry’s 
standard policy forms.30  Standard insurance forms usually originate 
from the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), an organization supported 
by the insurance industry.31  The first CGL policy was developed in 
1940; major revisions occurred in 1943, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1986.32 
In 1971, Roger C. Henderson, a tort scholar who was then an 
associate professor at the Nebraska School of Law, produced an article 
that is credited with first articulating the business risk doctrine.33  The 
phrase “business risk” did not originate with him, but with an exclusion 
that the insurance industry added to the CGL policy in 1966.34  In the 
most influential section of the article, Henderson wrote that “[t]he risk 
intended to be insured is the possibility that the . . . work of the insured, 
once relinquished or completed, will cause . . . damage to property other 
than to the . . . completed work itself, and for which the insured may be 
found liable.”35  It is ironic that Henderson is known for articulating the 
 
 29. See infra Part V. 
 30. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:18.  See generally Abraham, 
supra note 5 (discussing the history and development of CGL insurance since its origins 
in the nineteenth century). 
 31. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:6. 
 32. Id.  Reportedly, the CGL exclusions were narrowed over the years specifically 
to broaden coverage; insurance company publications made this clear.  Yet “[d]espite the 
revised policy exclusions, or perhaps because of them, insurance companies are asserting 
new grounds for denying coverage.”  Shapiro, supra note 14, at 79, 96. See also 4 
BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:28. 
 33. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441.  Henderson is currently a Professor of Law at 
the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. 
 34. Id. at 438.  Today, the standard CGL policy is generally considered to have five 
business risk exclusions—2j, 2k, 2l, 2m, and 2n—that could be subject to interpretation 
through the business risk doctrine.  See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37. 
In reality, exclusion j contains six subdivisions, two of which—j(5) and j(6)—operate as 
individual business risk exclusions. Id. These two, along with exclusion l, will be 
discussed later. See infra Part III.A.  2k excludes from coverage “ ‘[p]roperty damage’ to 
‘your product’ arising out of it or any part of it.”  Id. 2m excludes damage to impaired 
property or property not physically injured. 2n excludes damage from having to recall 
products or somehow fix work done. Id.; see also Gregory G. Schultz, Commercial 
General Liability Coverage of Faulty Construction Claims, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 257, 266 
(1997). 
 35. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441.  Henderson understood the rationale for the 
business risk exclusion to be that “the risks of . . . property damage arising from the 
planning stage of business are a business risk of the insured, that is, a responsibility 
which he must undertake just as he does for other business decisions.”  Id. at 440. 
7
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business risk doctrine because his article was written in part to criticize 
the 1966 revision.36  Nevertheless, it is his formulation of how a business 
risk exclusion operates, not his criticism, that has carried the day.  On the 
basis of this key passage, courts began to turn to the business risk 
doctrine to resolve questions of CGL coverage depending on whether the 
liability arose from tort or from contract.37 
What influence the Henderson article has enjoyed until now appears 
to be due to the even more influential CGL decision that was cited it, 
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.38 In Weedo, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
dealt with one construction company that had two claims brought against 
it under two different insurance companies’ CGL policies.39  Both 
involved claims of defective work: cracking stucco that had to be 
replaced and faulty roofing and gutter work.40  First, the Weedo court 
recounted how the appellate court ruled that the insurers were obliged to 
defend their insured because “certain exclusions of the policy, when read 
together, were ambiguous and hence had to be resolved against the 
insurer.”41  Then, signaling the new age, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
quoted at length from Henderson to embrace the distinction between 
contract and tort.42  The Weedo court reasoned that “the replacement or 
repair of faulty goods and works is a business expense, to be borne by 
the insured-contractor.”43  This left the court to conclude that “injury to 
persons and damage to other property constitute the risks intended to be 
covered under the CGL [policy].”44 
Minnesota is one of several jurisdictions that have adopted the 
approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court.45  So much so, it has been 
 
 36. Id. at 441.  Indeed, Henderson wrote that “the insurance industry would do well 
to eliminate the ‘Business Risk’ exclusion.”  Id. 
 37. Dotseth et al., supra note 7, at 598.  The distinction that courts make between 
contract and tort has been criticized. Id. The continuing influence of Henderson’s article 
for this idea has been criticized in particular: “The danger in relying upon an article 
written in 1971 is that the insurance industry and the coverages it markets have changed 
dramatically since the 1966 policy form, which was the subject of the [Henderson] 
article.”  4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:28. 
 38. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979). 
 39. Id. at 789. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 791. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 792. 
 45. See, e.g., Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1980); Peerless Ins. 
Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383 (Me. 1989); Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579 
N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1998); Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 
8
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said, that Minnesota is perhaps the jurisdiction most closely identified 
with the business risk doctrine.46  The first Minnesota decision that 
manifested the doctrine’s presence was the state supreme court’s 1982 
decision in Bor-Son Building Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union 
Insurance Co. of America.47  Bor-Son involved a landowner bringing suit 
against a general contractor who had constructed a building, claiming 
faulty workmanship and materials.48  Though the contractor had a CGL 
policy, the supreme court ruled that the insurer had no duty to defend 
because the damages arose out of the contractor’s breach of contract.49  
The building owner had not received the product “for which it had 
bargained.”50  In laying out the business risk doctrine, the court quoted 
Henderson’s formulation word for word—the same passage cited in 
Weedo—rather than somehow restating it.51 
In 1986, the supreme court was willing to elaborate this formulation 
in Knutson Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.52 
Like Bor-Son, Knutson arose from a claim by a property owner against a 
general contractor for faulty workmanship and defective materials.53  
The court affirmed its earlier ruling in Bor-Son, holding that the 
contractor had no CGL coverage because the claims derived from breach 
of contract.54  Yet even though Knutson quoted the same passage from 
Henderson as Bor-Son,55 the reasoning within Knutson did deviate from 
the mantra of “once relinquished or completed.”  Apparently without 
realizing what would contradict its earlier quoted passage, the court 
stated, lost in a long paragraph, that a CGL policy could shift the risk to 
the insurer for tort liability for that period “during the course of the work 
or, if a completed operations endorsement is paid for, thereafter.”56  A 
determination as to whether the supreme court realized it had laid the 
groundwork for a potential contradiction about timing had to wait for 
 
S.W.2d 760 (Tenn. 1979); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement, 
Inc., 526 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1999).  See also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Scope of 
Clause Excluding from Contractor’s or Similar Liability Policy, 8 A.L.R.4th 563 (1981) 
(discussing insurance exclusions from contractor’s coverage in different jurisdictions). 
 46. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37. 
 47. 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982). 
 48. Bor-Son, 323 N.W.2d at 59-60. 
 49. Id. at 63. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 396 N.W.2d 229 (Minn. 1986). 
 53. Id. at 231. 
 54. Id. at 235. 
 55. Id. at 232. 
 56. Id. at 234 (emphasis added). 
9
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Thommes, a case that involved tort liability to a third party. 
III. THE THOMMES DECISION 
A.  Facts 
Thommes & Thomas Land Clearing (Thommes) is a partnership 
that clears and grubs land for construction projects.57  In September 
1996, Thommes subcontracted to clear and grub land for a commercial 
development owned by Dean Morlock, Charles Vig, and HHA 
Development.58 Adjoining the land to be cleared lay property owned by 
Morlock’s sister and her husband, Donna and John Krajewski.59  It was 
not until Thommes had cleared portions of the land that belonged to the 
Krajewskis that it found out it had damaged property belonging to a third 
party.60 
In response to impending litigation by the Krajewskis, Thomas 
Benick, a partner of Thommes, made a handwritten statement about what 
had happened.61  According to this statement, it was “[a]bout halfway 
through the job” of clearing land on the development that Thommes 
started clearing land near the Krajewskis’ property.62 Where the 
development ended and the Krajewskis’ land began was unclear because 
no one had provided Thommes with written instructions. Further, unlike 
the rest of the property, no survey stakes marked the property lines.63 
Benick asked Morlock how close they should clear to the 
Krajewskis’ property.64  As Benick later recalled, Morlock “pointed and 
made a line” and said to clear everything out.65  Benick recounted that 
the land in question “looked like an area maintained by the homeowner 
[of the adjoining property]” and, as a result, “[he] questioned Morlock 
because it appeared [he] would be taking trees off the property” owned 
by the Krajewskis.66  Benick remembered Morlock saying not to worry 
 
 57. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001), aff’d 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002).  
 61. Handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas 
Land Clearing, Concerning the HHA Project (July 11, 1998) (on file with author). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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because it was his sister’s house and she and her husband were away on 
vacation.67  Still hesitant, Benick consulted with Knutson’s construction 
supervisor, the contractor who had hired Thommes as a subcontractor.68  
After the Knutson supervisor walked down the same area and Benick 
showed him what Morlock told Benick to do, the supervisor also said 
“do it.”69 
Benick estimated that the process of clearing this portion of the land 
“could have taken one week,” leaving Morlock plenty of opportunity to 
correct any error, but Thommes’ work continued uninterrupted until the 
Krajewskis came back home.70  After finding out that Thommes had 
indeed cut too far, Benick met with John Krajewski and Morlock, at 
which point Morlock denied ever having told Thommes to go so far.71  
By the end of the confrontation, Benick had agreed to look for 
replacement trees.72  Afterward, however, as Benick recalled it, Morlock 
told him not to plant the trees until he, Morlock, had finished grading the 
land.73  It is at this point that Benick wrote in his statement, “I thought 
this whole event was fishy . . . .”74  Benick recorded his newfound belief 
that Morlock knew the Krajewskis’ land had to be graded to finish his 
development, but that Morlock had not been able to get his brother-in-
law’s consent.75 
After the Krajewskis brought an action against Thommes for 
damage to their property, Thommes tendered defense to its CGL 
insurance carrier, Milwaukee Insurance Co. (Milwaukee).76  Milwaukee, 
however, declined either to defend or indemnify Thommes based on two 
exclusions77 in the policy, 2j(5) and 2j(6).78  2j(5) stated that coverage 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002). 
 77. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 104-05.  “[T]he current trend . . . is toward ever 
more narrow CGL coverage.  The original ‘comprehensive’ general liability insurance 
policy contained only five exclusions.  Over time the exclusions have proliferated.  
Today there are a minimum of fifteen exclusions in the standard-form CGL policy, 
occupying nearly four pages of fine print.”  Id. 
 78. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.  See generally 9 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 129:12 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6)).  If available, 
an insured may purchase a contractor’s rework endorsement for “the insured’s repair, 
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does not apply to “‘[p]roperty damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of real 
property on which you . . . are performing operations, if the ‘property 
damage’ arises out of those operations.”79  2j(6) stated that neither was 
there coverage for “ ‘property damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of any 
property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because ‘your . . . 
work’ was incorrectly performed on it.”80 
B.  The Court’s Analysis 
The trial court granted Milwaukee’s summary judgment motion 
after concluding that “the plain language” of the CGL policy denied 
coverage.81  Reversing on appeal, the court of appeals held that “the 
policy exclusions at issue are business risk exclusions that do not apply 
to injured third parties . . . .”82  For its part, the supreme court began its 
decision by duly noting that the “interpretation of an insurance policy is a 
question of law reviewed de novo”83 and that “[i]nsurance contract 
exclusions are construed strictly against the insurer.”84 
Moving on to its analysis, the court cited Bor-Son for the 
proposition that there are two types of risk that a contractor faces.85  The 
first type is that an insured may be liable through contract for defective 
work, in which case the business risk doctrine operates to exclude 
coverage.86  The second type includes the risk that a contractor’s work 
will cause “property damage to other property.”87  The court continued, 
“it was this type of risk, which may give rise to tort liability to third 
 
replacement, alteration, and/or removal” of defective work.  “Depending upon how the 
coverage is written, it can significantly narrow or eliminate the j(5) and j(6) exclusions 
contained in the standard CGL policy.”  Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Commercial General 
Liability Coverage, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW 5, 15 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter O’Connor, 
Liability Coverage]. 
 79. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 882. 
 80. Id. at 883. 
 81. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., No. C-1999-22166, slip op. at 7 (Scott 
County Dist. Ct. June 13, 2000). 
 82. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 83. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002).  The 
question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend or indemnify is also a question of law 
reviewed de novo.  Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 589 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn. 
1999). 
 84. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880 (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 
N.W.2d 605, 613 (Minn. 2001)). 
 85. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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parties,” against which CGL policies were intended to insure.88  In 
contrast to its earlier decisions on CGL coverage, the court quoted 
Henderson only by way of quoting Bor-Son.89 
Toward the beginning of its opinion, the court disclaimed slavish 
adherence to the business risk doctrine.90  Reviewing its past decisions in 
Bor-Son and Knutson, the court commented: “[W]e used business risk 
principles as a means of illuminating the underlying purpose of CGL 
insurance.  Notably absent from [these decisions] is any indication that 
these principles serve as the foundation for a separate ‘business risk 
doctrine’ that operates to override the express language of policy 
exclusions.”91  Nevertheless, when considering the first exclusion at 
issue, 2j(5), the court reasoned that the “underlying purpose of CGL 
insurance” rendered the exclusion ambiguous.92  Once the court found 
the exclusion ambiguous, it only needed to recite that “contract 
exclusions are to be construed strictly against the insurer” to hold that 
there was coverage.93 
When it came to the other provision at issue, 2j(6), the court 
produced a slightly different analysis.94  Instead of the business risk 
doctrine alone being sufficient to render the provision ambiguous, the 
court found multiple meanings within the policy’s actual language.95  
The court reasoned that the word “incorrect” could mean not only the 
manner in which work was conducted, but also the place where it was 
conducted.96  Because the court could foresee multiple meanings, it came 
to the same conclusion that the exclusion was ambiguous and must be 
 
 88. Id.  The court does, however, admit the possibility that an insurer and insured 
could contract otherwise for different coverage.  Id. at 882 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1983)). 
 89. Id. at 881. 
 90. Id. at 880. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 883. 
 93. Id. The court relied on recent precedent stating that exclusions in insurance 
contracts are construed strictly against the insurer. Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 
N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2001). See also Nathe Bros. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615 
N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2000). “Because most insurance policies are presented as 
preprinted forms, which a potential insured must usually accept or reject as a whole, 
ambiguities in a policy are generally resolved in favor of the insured.” Id. Nevertheless, 
when an insurance contract uses unambiguous language, the contract is given its plain 
and ordinary meaning.  Medica, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 
1997). 
 94. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883-84. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 883. 
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construed against the insurer to order coverage.97  Yet even though the 
court found 2j(6) ambiguous on its face, the court would have applied the 
same analysis as it had for 2j(5), had it been necessary.98  Thus, the 
majority’s holding that the mere “purpose” of CGL insurance makes a 
contract clause fatally ambiguous inhabits the whole case.  In effect, 
Thommes ruled that if an insured’s work may give rise to tort liability to 
third parties, then a CGL policy provides coverage.99 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THOMMES DECISION 
A.  The Missing Step 
What is noticeably absent from the Thommes decision is the passage 
from Henderson, as quoted in Weedo, that had been cited in prior 
Minnesota CGL coverage decisions.100  This absence, if not intentional, 
was certainly convenient, as it allowed the Minnesota Supreme Court to 
avoid a previous oversight in reasoning that would have become a full-
blown internal contradiction in Thommes. 
All three of the courts that adjudicated the Thommes case on its way 
up the chain—the district court, the court of appeals, and the supreme 
court—launched into an analysis of 2j(5) and 2j(6) without pausing to 
comment on why these exclusions in particular were at issue.101  Of 
course, from the time when a claim on the policy was first made, 
Milwaukee settled upon 2j(5) and 2j(6) as the basis for denying 
coverage.102  Perhaps each court only decided to refrain from interfering 
 
 97. Id. at 884. 
 98. Id. (Stringer, J., dissenting). It is for this reason that, when speaking of the 
whole case, the Thommes dissent states that “[t]he ambiguity found by the majority 
regarding whether the exclusion applies to property owned by third parties comes not 
from the language of the exclusion, but rather from the majority’s conception of the 
underlying purpose of CGL insurance . . . .”  Id.  
 99. Id. at 883. 
 100. See Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323 
N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982); Knutson, 396 N.W.2d at 232. 
 101. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., No. C-1999-22166, slip op. at 7 (Scott 
County Dist. Ct. June 13, 2000). The district court’s memorandum states flatly that “there 
is no issue that the language of either exclusion 2j(5) or 2j(6) is ambiguous.”  Id.  The 
court of appeals framed the issue outright as whether exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6) barred 
coverage.  Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.  Similarly, in the supreme court’s decision, the 
court wrote that “[t]he question here is whether the damage to the Krajewskis’ property is 
excluded from coverage by section 2j(5) or section 2j(6)”—not which exclusions might 
exclude coverage.   See Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 882. 
 102. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157. 
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with Milwaukee’s choice in defenses.  Nevertheless, such cryptic writing 
by the courts means that the reasoning that went into accepting 2j(5) and 
2j(6) as the exclusions in play must be deduced. 
If the Thommes court had taken a step back to examine afresh all the 
exclusions in the policy, the initial uncertainty would have centered on 
whether 2l—another standard CGL policy exclusion, but not raised in the 
case—or 2j(5) and (6) applied.  2l excludes “ ‘[p]roperty damage’ to 
‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it and included in the 
‘products-completed operations hazard.’ ”103  The products-completed 
operations hazard to which 2l refers is defined as “property damage” 
except “work that has not yet been completed or abandoned.”104  
Through the products-completed operations hazard, it becomes clear that 
2l presides over completed operations.105  Unlike 2l, 2j(5)’s phrase “are 
performing operations” narrows 2j(5) to only ongoing operations.106  
Distinguishing between 2l and 2j(6) is done through the “products-
completed operations hazard.”107  2j(6), commonly known as the “faulty 
workmanship” exclusion,108 contains the disclaimer that coverage “does 
not apply to ‘property damage’ included in the ‘products-completed 
operations hazard.’ ”109  Putting these two negatives together, 2j(6) is at 
issue only for ongoing operations.  Thus a central difference between 2l 
and 2j(5) and (6) is one of timing: whether the damage occurred from 
ongoing or completed operations.110 
When did the damage in Thommes happen?  If Thommes started 
clearing the Krajewskis’ land at the same time it was clearing the 
development’s land, or before it had finished clearing the development’s 
land, 2j(5) and (6) would apply because the damage would have occurred 
while operations were ongoing—the work itself would be the damage.  
However, if Thommes had finished doing all the work on the 
 
 103. GCL Policy, supra note 7.  
 104. Id. 
 105. See Schultz, supra note 34, at 271. 
 106. O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8. See also Spears v. Smith, 
690 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (exclusion 2j(5) does not apply to damages 
discovered after the work has been completed because the exclusion is written in the 
present tense); Houston Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 799 S.W.2d 308, 
311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Franco, supra note 13, at 796. In Action Auto Stores, Inc. v. 
United Capitol Ins. Co., a court rejected an insurer’s attempt to argue that 2j(5)’s phrase 
“if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations” meant that the exclusion applies 
to completed operations.  845 F. Supp. 428, 434 (W.D. Mich. 1993). 
 107. CGL Policy, supra note 7. 
 108. O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8. 
 109. CGL Policy, supra note 7. 
 110. Compare CGL exclusion 2l with exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6). 
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development’s land and only then started working on the Krajewskis’ 
property, a third-party property, then its work would have been 
considered complete under Definition 14b(1)—“When all of the work 
called for in your contract has been completed.”111  In effect, Thommes’ 
work would be considered complete when Thommes finished doing the 
work called for in the contract, not the work Thommes thought was 
called for in the contract. 
From the statements available,112 the sequence of Thommes’ work 
is not entirely clear.  As detailed above, Benick recalled that Thommes 
started working on the Krajewskis’ property “about halfway” through its 
work.113  This accounting indicates that the damage was discovered 
while operations were still ongoing.  However, while Benick’s statement 
records the discussions that went on after the damage was discovered, it 
makes no mention of having more work left to complete on the 
development’s property.114  Still, the insurer did choose 2j(5) and 2j(6) 
as the exclusions by which to deny coverage, thereby suggesting that 
damages did occur during Thommes’ operations.115 
The timing of the damage warrants investigation because, at first 
glance, it is a surprise that the business risk doctrine comes up at all in 
connection with 2j(5) and (6).  In the article that originally formulated 
the business risk doctrine, Henderson asserts that the risk intended to be 
insured is the possibility that the insured’s work will cause tort liability 
to a third party “once relinquished or completed.”116  On the face of it, 
then, the business risk doctrine should not apply in Thommes as it 
involved an ongoing operation. 
Indeed, at least one court, when faced with a CGL ongoing 
operation exclusion, incorporated the business risk doctrine that led to an 
outright contradiction in its holding.  In Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. 
 
 111. CGL Policy, supra note 7. 
 112. See handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas, 
Concerning the HHA Project (July 11, 1998), Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393); handwritten statement of Gary Dawson, 
Agent for RKI, Concerning the HHA Project (August 5, 1998), Thommes v. Milwaukee 
Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393). 
 113. Handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas, 
Concerning the HHA Project, dated July 11, 1998, Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 160. The court of appeals took it as settled that 
Thommes damaged the Krajewskis’ property “in the course of clearing” the 
development’s property. Id. 
 116. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441 (emphasis added). 
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Donmac Golf Shaping Co., Inc., the Georgia Court of Appeals dealt with 
a fact situation strikingly similar to Thommes.117  After a contractor 
completed construction of a golf course, the developer discovered that 
substantial parts of it had been built on federally protected wetlands.118  
In effect, the contractor had built on a third party’s property and, as the 
court put it, this construction “obviously occurred contemporaneously 
with the work being performed on the project.”119  Like the court in 
Thommes, the Georgia Court of Appeals ultimately held that 2j(5) and 
(6) did not work to exclude coverage because the damages were “beyond 
the scope of the contractual expectations” in tort.120  Nevertheless, the 
court’s restatement of the business risk doctrine by which it justified its 
decision, taken as usual from Weedo, was that “[t]he risk intended to be 
insured is the possibility that the . . . work of the insured, once 
relinquished or completed, will cause . . . damage to property other than 
to the . . . completed work itself.”121  It escaped the court that a doctrine 
contingent on the existence of completed work cannot be applied to a 
fact situation involving contemporaneous work.122 
The “once relinquished or completed” language perplexed both 
sides in Thommes.  In its brief to the supreme court, Milwaukee argued 
that “[a] review of the law review article giving rise to the adoption of 
the business risk doctrine in Minnesota, as well as the New Jersey 
decision cited extensively by [the supreme court] when it adopted the 
doctrine . . .” revealed that the court of appeals had misinterpreted this 
illustrative phrase.123  Namely, Milwaukee argued that the first line of 
the oft-quoted passage by Henderson in Weedo contains the “critical 
qualification” that coverage applies only after the work is complete.124  
To buttress its argument, Milwaukee then asserted that no coverage for 
 
 117. 417 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
 118. Id. at 198. 
 119. Id. at 199. 
 120. Id. at 201. 
 121. Id. at 200 (emphasis added). 
 122. Though not directly dealing with the ongoing operations exclusions of 2j(5) and 
(6), Knutson also could be considered to have an internal contradiction.  Although 
Knutson contains the Henderson quotation, “once relinquished or completed,” the court 
later talks about a CGL policy being intended to cover third-party damage from both 
completed operations and also during the course of the insured’s work.  Knutson, 396 
N.W.2d at 234.  See also Weaver v. Drew, No. 96-0454, 1996 WL 588060, *3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1996) (discussing 2j(6) exclusion while relying on precedent that quotes “once 
relinquished or completed” passage). 
 123. Appellant’s Brief at 25, Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877 
(Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]. 
 124. Id. at 26. 
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ongoing operations “dovetails with the purpose of the business risk 
doctrine . . .” because an insured “can control the risks to third-party 
property” while on the job.125  “[T]he insured is present and can control 
his or her actions,” whereas later, an insured has “less control.”126  
Milwaukee even cited the Weedo pronouncement that CGL insurance 
“does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship but rather faulty 
workmanship which causes an accident” in support of its position.127 
In its responding brief, Thommes asserted that Milwaukee’s 
argument failed because it was internally inconsistent.128  Thommes 
argued that the nature of Milwaukee’s argument conceded that there 
could be coverage to third-party property arising from completed work, 
if not ongoing work.129  However, according to Thommes, if the court 
adopted Milwaukee’s definition of “your work”—a phrase contained in 
the exclusions 2j(6) and 2l—then the court would never grant coverage 
for completed operations.130  Thommes concluded that Milwaukee’s 
point had to be rejected because never granting coverage was an 
impossibility.131  Thommes was responding to the fact that insureds 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 26-27. 
 127. Id. at 27 (quoting Weedo, 405 A.2d at 796).  If Milwaukee had prevailed on its 
point of a literal reading of Henderson, it only would have created future problems.  The 
business risk doctrine is founded on the concept that an insured should not receive 
coverage for damages arising from business risks that were within its own control.  
O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15.  To realize this principle, courts have developed the 
practice of ruling no coverage for damages arising from a contract with a first-party 
property and for coverage for damages arising from tort suffered by a third party. Dotseth 
et al., supra note 7, at 601. In order to see Milwaukee’s argument through to a logical 
conclusion, courts would have to create a distinction between torts that (1) arise in the 
course of the insured’s work, and (2) those that arise from work after it is completed.  
The artificiality of this distinction is indicative of the criticism commentators have made 
of the business risk doctrine overall. The doctrine covers tort claims under CGL policies, 
but not contract claims, even though both can arise from negligent behavior.  See 
generally Dotseth et al., supra note 7.  And yet, a tort is a tort is a tort—a wrong or 
breach of duty, regardless of when it occurs. See BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 1496.  
Negligence is theoretically a wrong that can be avoided, regardless of the degree of 
control one has over the tortious behavior.  Even when damages arise after work is 
completed, the wrongful act that led to damage still must have occurred during the course 
of work.  Only the extent of damages can vary.  See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:23.  
See also O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 14.  If the court had addressed 
Milwaukee’s argument, such a reading would not have satisfied the business risk 
doctrine. 
 128. Respondent’s Brief at 22-23, Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 641 
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393) [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
 129. Id. at 22. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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generally want a court to use as narrow a definition of “your work” as 
possible to make the corresponding exclusion as narrow as possible.132 
Through the briefs from both sides in Thommes, the supreme court 
must have been aware of the dispute over timing.  Yet strangely, 
nowhere in the opinion does the supreme court comment on this 
difference from Henderson, which had been quoted verbatim in earlier 
decisions.133  Even though the explanation for the phrase “once 
relinquished or completed” lay there to be discovered, Henderson had 
been quoted out of context in previous court decisions.134  The full 
passage from which Henderson’s oft-quoted language was plucked is one 
in which he is not discussing the business risk doctrine overall.135 
Instead, he is specifically discussing the “products hazard and completed 
operations” provision (today’s “products-completed operations 
hazard”).136  Again, it is the products-completed operations hazard that 
limits 2l’s application to completed work, completely distinct from 2j(5) 
and (6) exclusions that apply to ongoing operations.137  When Henderson 
wrote of the “risk intended to be insured” that precedes the “once 
relinquished or completed” phrase, he was writing about the risk to be 
insured by the products-completed operations hazard, not the business 
risk doctrine generally.138  Instead of proposing to limit CGL coverage to 
damages that arise after work is complete, Henderson was narrowly 
discussing a provision that, by its own terms, was confined to damages 
having arisen after completed work.139 
 
 132. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:43. 
 133. See, e.g, Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 
323 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986).  There is at least one decision from the court of 
appeals, though dealing with different versions of exclusions, that preceded the supreme 
court’s position in Thommes. See Western World Ins. Co. v. H.D. Eng’g Design & 
Erection Co., 419 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  The Western World decision 
involved employees of a subcontractor who negligently placed materials on top of a 
partially completed building and caused it to collapse.  Id. at 631.  The court of appeals 
found the effect of the business risk doctrine in Western World distinguishable from Bor-
Son and Knutson.  Id. at 635.  The court held that the subcontractor’s insurer had a duty 
to defend and indemnify because the damages arose from tort liability to a third party.  Id.  
The court reached this decision despite the fact that the actions giving rise to the liability 
occurred while the work was still in progress.  Id. at 631.  The Western World decision 
did not comment on timing. 
 134. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. 
 135. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441. 
 136. See CGL Policy, supra note 7. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441. 
 139. Id. 
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The ritualized quoting of Henderson that has omitted this language 
ever after is part of Weedo’s lasting legacy, demonstrating the perils of 
taking key passages of another decision wholesale.  Henderson stated 
elsewhere in his article that “there are no tenable distinctions [in whether 
to grant coverage] between errors in planning and production.”140  When, 
according to Henderson, “liability is imposed on the fault basis of 
negligence, the standard is one of ordinary care in each situation.”141  
From Henderson’s perspective, the timing of the damages would only be 
a factor like any other in determining what is ordinary care, not 
something that precluded coverage altogether.  In speaking of the 
products hazard and completed operations provision, Henderson’s point 
was to show that the impulse behind the provision was in keeping with 
its historical forerunner, the “premises and operations” provision that 
provided coverage for ongoing operations.142  If Henderson considered 
the current form for exclusions 2j(5) and (6), his reasoning would lead 
him to concur with Thommes that if an insured’s work may give rise to 
tort liability to third parties, then a CGL policy should provide coverage 
without regard to timing.143  Thus, Milwaukee was correct that the 
meaning of the “once relinquished or completed” passage changed when 
the first sentence was restored to its rightful place, just not in the way 
that it hoped.144 
The Minnesota Supreme Court skipped a step in reasoning when it 
failed to convey that it was dropping the “once relinquished or 
completed” qualification from its understanding of the business risk 
doctrine.145  Nevertheless, the absence of any timing qualification did 
allow the court to avoid an outright contradiction between the business 
risk doctrine’s formulation and application.  Knutson’s aside about 
coverage during the course of an insured’s work does perhaps suggest 
that the court had it clear for itself that CGL coverage applied without 
 
 140. Id. at 440. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 417.  The premises and operations provision is intended to cover “injuries 
to third persons arising out of conditions or activities on or near [an insured’s] premises 
and for operations away from such premises but related thereto.”  Id.  
 143. Id. at 418. Henderson has detailed the distinction between exclusions based on 
timing in a passage on the history of CGL insurance. Id. The distinction is a function of 
the premises and operations provision having originated before, and being sold separately 
from, the products-completed operations hazard.  Id. 
 144. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 123, at 25. 
 145. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881. The Thommes court merely wrote that the risk 
intended to be insured by CGL policies is the risk that an insured’s work will cause 
property damage to third-party property and may give rise to tort liability.  Id. 
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regard to timing.146  Whatever the case, the path from Bor-Son to 
Thommes only becomes clear after one considers the business risk 
doctrine in its original context.  Thus, although Thommes does not 
announce that it has revised the business risk doctrine, a revised 
formulation still emerges from it, and one that states what the court 
actually thinks: the risk intended to be insured is that which may give 
rise to tort liability to third parties.147 
B.  Trying to Have It Both Ways 
As a missing step, not a misstep, in the supreme court’s reasoning, 
the above analysis does not affect the court’s ultimate holding.  
Reconstructing this step, however, does reveal the incremental way in 
which the court has refined the business risk doctrine from Bor-Son to 
Thommes, possibly to the cast that the court is willing to see brought 
before it in the future.  By not discarding a doctrine that some have 
criticized,148 Thommes in essence recommitted Minnesota to the business 
risk doctrine framework.  However, the Minnesota courts’ present 
handling of the business risk doctrine precludes it from ever being fully 
realized. 
As the Thommes court itself declared, the interpretation of an 
insurance contract must be decided as a matter of law, not fact.149  The 
purported operating principle behind the business risk doctrine used to 
interpret an insurance contract—that one should receive coverage only 
for unavoidable damages—should make coverage depend on whether an 
insured has committed a tort.150  After all, a tort is an avoidable 
consequence that arises through unreasonable behavior.151  In Minnesota, 
courts have ruled that, of the spectrum of torts, a CGL policy may cover 
negligence, but not intentional torts.152  Negligence alone does not 
necessarily make an action fall within a CGL policy’s scope.153  Yet, as 
 
 146. 396 N.W.2d at 234. 
 147. 641 N.W.2d at 881. 
 148. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 18; 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 
11:37. 
 149. 641 N.W.2d at 879. 
 150. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15. 
 151. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 1496. 
 152. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enter., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 453 
(Minn. 1997). 
 153. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frost Paint & Oil Corp., No. C3-97-1118, 1998 WL 
27247, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1998) (stating that “faulty workmanship alone does 
not constitute an occurrence”). A CGL policy defines an occurrence as “an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
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with other torts, determining negligence is primarily a question of fact.154  
Thus, bringing the business risk doctrine to its complete realization 
intrinsically involves deciding some question of fact. 
If material facts are deemed not in dispute, as in a summary 
judgment decision, a court should in theory be able to attribute to them 
their legal significance and decide the case as a matter of law.155  If, 
furthermore, a court ascribes to the business risk doctrine, it would 
appear that whether an insured received coverage would hinge on a 
court’s determination of whether the insured was negligent.  Yet 
Thommes, through a review of a summary judgment of what is in essence 
a negligence claim,156 never mentioned whether the facts had to be 
viewed in the light more favorable to one claimant rather than the 
other.157  This absence is in keeping with a court that does not feel the 
need to decide whether an insured has been negligent. 
It is only to be expected that as a case rises through the appeals 
process, the substantive legal issues rise to the fore, while the facts 
recede into the background.158  Still, it is beneficial to compare what 
facts the court of appeals found worthy of mention versus the supreme 
court.  The court of appeals stated: 
Before [Thommes’] employees commenced clearing, Dean 
Morlock pointed out a tree marking the property line up to 
which appellant was to cut and clear trees.  When asked 
whether certain brush and trees were on the adjacent property, 
Morlock told [Thommes’] employees not to worry because his 
sister owned the property.  [Thommes’] employees cleared the 
trees as instructed, but later learned they had destroyed trees on 
the Krajewski property.159 
 
conditions.”  CGL Policy, supra note 7. 
 154. Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 823 (N.D. 1968). 
 155. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 37 (2001). “If there are no questions of fact, 
the court applies the law in accordance with the admitted facts.”  Id. 
 156. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Summary Judgment § 8 (2001). “Summary judgment is not 
usually as feasible in negligence cases as in other kinds of litigation because issues of 
negligence . . . are not ordinarily susceptible of summary adjudication for or against the 
plaintiff or claimant.”  Id. 
 157. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. Instead, the Thommes court wrote: “On a review 
of a summary judgment, this court determines whether there are any genuine issues of 
material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law . . . . The parties in 
this case agree as to the material facts.”  Id. 
 158. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 662 (1995). Generally speaking, “an appellate 
court does not reweigh the evidence presented in the court below.”  Id. 
 159. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001), aff’d, 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002). 
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The court of appeals included enough facts to make Thommes’ 
behavior appear reasonable.160  In contrast, the supreme court’s decision 
touched only briefly on the facts: “Complying with Morlock’s 
instructions as to the area to be cleared and grubbed, Thommes cleared 
and grubbed approximately one-half acre of the Krajewskis’ land . . . .  
That land was not a part of the HHA property and the Krajewskis did not 
consent to it being cleared and grubbed.”161  The supreme court’s facts 
perhaps give the impression that Thommes was not negligent.  Yet the 
relative lack of factual background in the supreme court’s decision 
suggests that the supreme court did not want to appear swayed by the 
facts, one way or the other. 
Despite the supreme court’s pronouncement that “the material facts” 
were undisputed,162 both Thommes and Milwaukee took the opportunity 
in their briefs to dispute those facts.  The dispute centered on whether 
Thommes had been negligent, even though a settlement had already been 
reached between Thommes and the Krajewskis by the time their dispute 
came up on appeal.163  For instance, in its brief, Milwaukee asserted that 
“[t]here is no dispute that Respondent [Thommes] had the ability to 
demand a survey from the general contractor or perform one at its own 
expense to establish boundaries.”164  Thommes countered in its own brief 
that “[t]his ‘fact’ has not been established.”165 
All of this suggests that the facts do matter.  The court had Benick’s 
statement available to it.  Perhaps the court in Thommes unconsciously 
wanted to provide coverage for an insured that it did not consider 
negligent.  There has been no harm in the Thommes case because it does 
not appear that the insured was negligent.  But it is unclear that the 
supreme court will handle a future case in the same way as Thommes if it 
feels that an insured has been negligent. 
An alternative to the approach adopted by Minnesota courts may be 
available. In Utility Maintenance Contractors, Inc. v. West American 
Insurance Co., the Kansas Court of Appeals decided its own CGL 
coverage case.166  The city of Offerle hired Utility, a contractor insured 
 
 160. Id. at 157. 
 161. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. 
 162. Id. at 878. 
 163. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 128, at 32.  The Krajewskis’ complaint had 
requested damages of $35,000. Id. Thommes settled the Krajewskis’ claim for $15,000.  
Id. 
 164. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 123, at 4. 
 165. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 128, at 4. 
 166. 866 P.2d 1093 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).  Another case that decided the issue of 
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by West American, to remove a sewage clog in the city sewer line.167  To 
remove the clog, Utility used a root cutter, which traveled over a hundred 
feet to reach the problem site.168  Because a bolt fell off while traveling 
in the line, the root cutter was defective and caused damage to the 
sewer.169 
As one of its defenses to providing coverage, the insurance 
company raised exclusion 2j(5).170  While the court agreed with the 
insurer to bar coverage for the 115 feet of sewer line the root cutter had 
to travel to reach the clog site, the court decided differently for any 
damage past it.171  The court reasoned that: 
[a]ny damage that occurred beyond the clog site . . . may be 
excluded by section 2.J.(5), depending upon a factual showing 
on remand that it was the usual and necessary practice under 
similar circumstances to use the cutter beyond the initial point 
in the line where the clog is first noted.172 
By asking what is “the usual and necessary practice,”173 the court 
converted the question of coverage for any damage past 115 feet into a 
fact question. 
Unlike Thommes, the damages in Utility occurred on the customer’s 
own property, not that of a third party.174  Normally, a court following 
the business risk doctrine would decide the situation in Utility as a 
contract issue across the board, rather than tort.175  In Utility, it is unclear 
whether the court is consciously trying to follow the business risk 
doctrine or not.176  Yet whether on the contract or tort side of the 
 
coverage as a fact question is Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000).  
Doerr involved water contaminated by an oil refinery’s pollution, and determination of 
the coverage issue depended on how a pollution exclusion was interpreted. 774 So. 2d at 
122-23.  The court ruled that the determination of key terms, such as polluter, pollutant, 
and discharge, had to be decided by the trier of fact.  Id. at 135-37. 
 167. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1095. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1097. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Compare Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 877 with Utility, 866 P.2d at 1093. 
 175. See, e.g., Thommes, 641 N.W.2d 889 (recognizing that “it is well established 
that general contract principles govern the construction of insurance policies . . .”). 
 176. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1096. The Utility decision never names the business risk 
doctrine.  However, the court does include reasoning along the lines mentioned in 
Thommes, noting that the two types of risk involved for an insured contractor are: (1) the 
risk that “is in the warranties that arise under the contract,” and (2) the risk of “tort 
liability for ‘injury to people and damage to property other than the work performed.’ ”  
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business risk doctrine’s distinction, this case still carries implications for 
a case like Thommes.  As a case on the business risk doctrine’s contract 
side, the Kansas Court of Appeals could have used the business risk 
doctrine’s distinction between contract and tort to deny coverage out of 
hand, as Minnesota courts did in Bor-Son and Knutson.177  The 
significance of the Utility analysis for the Thommes court is that the 
Utility court allowed a fact question to decide the issue of coverage.178  
A court could follow Utility’s lead to make coverage in tort situations 
also dependent on a fact inquiry. 
The Thommes court has hedged the predicament of reconciling a 
type of claim that must be decided as a matter of law to another that must 
be decided as a question of fact.  In Thommes, the court wrote that CGL 
policies are intended to insure against risk that may give rise to tort 
liability to third parties.179  Yet if courts are to dictate coverage on the 
basis of what may give rise to tort liability, without regard to whether an 
insured was negligent, what is the point of bothering about the business 
risk doctrine at all?  The business risk doctrine is seen as the great 
weapon of the insurance industry.180  However, deciding coverage 
without a fact inquiry—which ensures that coverage is not a fact- 
dependent outcome—removes the possibility for the business risk 
doctrine to work at all.  As in Thommes, courts will be able to find a 
CGL insurance contract “ambiguous” and construe its terms against the 
 
Id. (quoting Owings v. Gifford, 697 P.2d 865, 869 (Kan. 1985)). 
 177. See Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323 
N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “since the alleged building damages were the 
result of alleged breach of contract, there was no duty” on the insurer to defend its 
insured); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 
(Minn. 1986) (“[T]he CGL policy does not provide coverage for claims of defective 
materials and workmanship giving rise to a claim for damage to the property itself which 
is the subject matter of the construction project.”). 
 178. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1097. 
 179. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881.  Currently, the law tries to relieve the insured of 
an obligation to prove any requisite facts in order to obtain a defense.  See 4 BRUNER & 
O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:20 (discussing the duty to defend).  Thus, one attraction 
of the supreme court’s approach in Thommes could be that coverage for what may give 
rise to tort liability avoids giving an insurer grounds to evade its duty to defend its 
insured.  That is, if one could get CGL coverage only if non-negligent, a circular inquiry 
could develop in which an insured would need a trial to demonstrate that its insurer 
should defend.  Of course, that is not too far off from what happened in Thommes, what 
with the insured Thommes having to go to court against its insurer to gain the duty to 
indemnify. 
 180. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15 (characterizing the business risk doctrine as 
a “tried and true weapon” of the insurance industry, even to the point of defeating the 
plain words in a CGL insurance policy). 
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drafter as long as the damage occurs on a third party’s property.181 
V. CONCLUSION 
To reach a seemingly novel decision for providing coverage, the 
Thommes court simply returned to the sources of CGL insurance.  By 
examining the troublesome phrase “once relinquished or completed” in 
its original context, it becomes apparent that Thommes reveals that the 
business risk doctrine does not have a restrictive timing distinction.  
Instead, the way timing interplays with a CGL policy’s coverage depends 
on which provisions an insured has specifically purchased.  However 
successful Thommes’ revisitation of the doctrine is, the business risk 
doctrine still contains the intrinsic problem of having to decide a 
question of fact as matter of law.  Perhaps the court is satisfied that its 
rendition of the business risk doctrine—coverage for third-party tort 
damages for which one may be found liable—sufficiently mitigates the 
paradox. 
Insurance companies originally propagated the business risk 
doctrine before the courts as a way to narrow coverage.182  And, indeed, 
this is what happened in such landmark Minnesota cases as Bor-Son183 
and Knutson,184 because of this self-same business risk doctrine.  In the 
end, however, the intent behind the doctrine, as the Minnesota Supreme 
Court understood it, has allowed an insured like Thommes to beat the 
insurers at their own game. 
 
 
 181. 641 N.W.2d at 883. 
 182. See O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8-9. 
 183. 323 N.W.2d at 63. 
 184. 396 N.W.2d at 235. 
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